‘POST-PARADIGMATIC DIASPORA’ IN RESPONSE TO PARADigm ‘VIOLENCE’: TOWARDS A PROLIFERATION OF EPISTEMOLOGIES IN SOCIO-CULTURAL RESEARCH

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Abstract

Although Caputo has coined the term of ‘post-paradigmatic diaspora’ for more than a quarter of a decade, the term remained not in attendance by scholars concerning themselves in the science of epistemology in social and human research. Caputo himself used the term in the context of radical hermeneutics without providing sufficient engagement to delineate what the term comes to mean especially the term Diaspora. In this paper, I wish to engage with the term from the perspective of socio-cultural paradigmatic epistemology in social, cultural and human research to argue in favour of a proliferation of epistemologies in the era of post-modernity. In so doing I utilise the ancient argument of Frankfort School (namely: Adorno, Horkheimer, and Benjamen) of Diasporic Philosophy by offering another reading from the post-modernist vantage point. Diasporic philosophy acknowledges diasporic thinking which acts as a gate that unbinds the mind from the monolith of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’, and enables creative improvisations and births that make diaspora an impetus to new possibilities for happiness, meaning, aim, and togetherness. With the assumption that culturally and paradigmatically informed epistemologies entail essentialist, determinist and hegemonic approaches to ‘reality’ and meanings, I perceive a re-contextualisation of Diasporic Philosophy in this particular juncture of our history a compelling epistemology that guides our interpretations and meaning-making in the field of social research. In contemporary times where societies and identities are fragmented and new forms of social and political conflicts continue to emerge, I argue that Diasporic Philosophy could mount as a corrective locale to ethnocentric cultural discourses and work as antidote against the ‘violence’ and monolith of modernist certainties and positivistic approaches to knowledge. The paper contributes to the wider debate of the philosophy of meaning by offering an alternative epistemology that guides our analyses and interpretations of meanings in human and social research.

Key words: Epistemology, Diasporic Philosophy, Social & Human Research, Research Paradigm.

Introduction

The last few decades have revealed a resurgence of interest in questioning the orthodox consensus regarding what has been so far believed to be grounded paradigm in social research. In what is coded within the terms 'post-modern' or 'post-structural', and largely 'post-colonial', intellectuals working in the ‘science’ of social research have increasingly espoused scepticism on the foundational views of knowledge, and certainties (Lather, 1992). For example, we see 'critical hermeneutics' for 'post-conditions' and 'post-paradigmatic diaspora' (Caputo, 1987); the 'lust' of 'fictional frames' (Hassan, 1987); 'critical feminist methodologies' (Lather, 1992); the metaphors of 'ethical responsibilities' (Ropers-Huilman, 1999); 'deconstructionism at work' (Sondergaard, 2002); 'racist epistemologies' (Scherurich and Young, 2002); and ‘locus of enunciation’ Mignolo (2000). Lather (1992), for example, questions the (scientific) paradigm in the context of what Habermas (1975) calls
a 'legitimation crisis' in cultural authority: it “is a time of the confrontation of the lust for absolutes, for certainty in our ways of knowing” (p. 88).

Meanings, nowadays, are rhythmic in shape and dynamic in structure without rigid, closed, or static boundaries, and approaches to them have turned into regulated disorder and planned chaos keeping the stance of knowledge itself in flux, in motion, and repeating forward. Consciously or instinctively researchers, particularly those new to the field, have, therefore, found a re-embodiment of the ‘scientific revaluation’ and ‘paradigm shift’ (Kuhn, 1970) a workable epistemology for answering their ‘concrete’ problems by surpassing the ‘conceptual frameworks’ and research paradigms. Recurrently, they attempt a proliferation of approaches, and to far extent, epistemologies, into understanding their emergent and new forms of problems. Research into critical inquiry, in particular, exceeds the tradition of the structural approaches that are 'ruled by method' (Feyerabend, 1993) and strict conceptual frameworks into a multitude of 'loosely defined' methodologies (Lather, 1992). In this sense, critical inquiry in a post-modern era bears responsibility for dynamic knowledge discourses that refute 'transparent and universal truth' (Ropers-Huilman, 1999). It also takes up conceptual 'frameworks' to be in motion, context specific and interactive (ibid).

The proliferation of epistemologies is not simply academic in fashion; it is rather a response to substantive changes in the way we perceive what it means a claim for knowledge and meaning-making, from the most private and intimate to the most exoteric and global. In an era that is fraught with globalising capitalism, the stance of knowledge has become more complicated concept and even more challenging to people around the globe (Gur-Ze'ev, 2005). Similarly, the ‘new times’ have projected dramatic changes in the social, cultural, political, and economical spheres, which have brought fragmentation and growing pluralism of societies, and emergence of new identities, which render normative and stable meanings and discourses problematic (Kocatepe, 2005). People have become mystified by the insurgency, disintegration, and ‘liquidity’ (Bauman, 2000, 2001) of an age that is burdened with growing demands of ever-changing needs, obligations, and new versions of social and political conflicts around the globe (Abu-Shomar, 2011). The expansion of media and migration, for example, have created what Zygmunt Bauman (2001), refers to as 'the global rise of "liquid life"' resonating with Arjun Appadurai’s Modernity at Large.

Additionally, to use Gur-Ze'ev’s (2005) words, “there always exist other possibilities of new critical language and of spanning further potentials for approaching the nearness of truth and the richness of life, which are always a matter for human concern” (p. 25). In this sense, the conditions of promoting different epistemological alternatives require researchers in human sciences to explore and search for other possibilities to challenge the stability of meanings and consider new ways of thinking that surpass ideology, dogma, ‘conceptual framework’ and the notion of paradigm itself. To this end, I perceive my theoretical engagements with the notions of the philosophy of meaning, epistemology and research paradigm an attempt to seek for an alternative epistemic stance that ‘guides’ our interpretations and knowledge production concerning social research. Therefore, I, first, reconfigure the notion of research paradigm and culturally informed epistemologies. Second, I examine the concept of Diasporic Philosophy in the critical tradition of Frankfort School for a possibility to introduce a 'post-paradigmatic' epistemological stance in the field of socio-cultural research. I use a ‘constructivist approach’ by exploring the emergent theoretical trends which proliferate in tandem with the process of meaning-making and knowledge production including post-modernist, post-structuralist and post-colonialist thinking tools. I conclude by proposing Diasporic Philosophy as a robust critical stance that researchers in social sciences might utilise to ‘guide’ their approaches to knowledge production.

**Reconfiguring research paradigm**
After Kuhn, Caputo (1987) argues that the 'post-conditions' of contemporariness require a 'post-paradigmatic diaspora' that cuts the concept of paradigm itself and enables research into concrete social inquiries rather than celebrating the paradigm as a 'conceptual framework'. According to him, paradigm, as a set of rules or theories, cannot be applied to concrete problems or to "rationalise the paradigms by reducing them to rules" (p. 216). Rules or 'theories' according to Heidegger (as cited in Caputo, p. 216) are "embedded in a paradigmatic exercise so that the scientist has more a working mastery of these concepts than a reflective grasp of them, [which] demands a certain insight into the demands of a concrete problem" (p. 216). Paradigms, moreover, entail 'violence' since the scientific community that is organised around a paradigm, believing in making that paradigm a 'conceptual framework', 'a way of seeing things' makes the adopted paradigm a pejorative concept for the dominant mode of social inquiry and a 'code word of meaning'. Derrida (1974) insists that such violence must be seen as violence since every paradigm is a fiction, a contingency, and a "way of laying things out which cannot claim absolute status or immunity from reform" (p. 217). Building on this, the dominating nature of paradigm overlooks the discursive and context-bounded nature of social inquiries, and, does not only marginalise the voices of 'others', but also, in many cases, provides less effective solutions beyond what conceptual 'frameworks' could offer. Heidegger, Kuhn, and Derrida (as cited in Caputo, p. 220) view paradigm as being structured around 'subversiveness' and 'normalcy', or "only a certain contingent arrangement of signs whose efficaciousness is responsible for its success but which is so marked by contingency that it is always vulnerable to subversion".

As an approach to knowledge, the conditions of a 'post-paradigmatic' inquiry acknowledge the 'gaps' and 'discontinuities' that paradigm fails to notice. Post-positivist approaches (post-modernism, post-structuralism, and post-colonialism), according to Ninnes and Burnett (2003), are developed to examine the 'shifts', 'developments' and 'omissions' in paradigms that their pleas for coherence and focus on methods fail to notice. In their meta-narratives, these approaches set out to 'problematise systems' calling for radical shifts from the modernist certainties and essentialist views of reality to non-essentialist post-modernist destabilisations which view reality as multiple and constantly changing. They move from "paradigms which emphasise structural relations to those which focus on simulations and hyperreality" (p. 279). After Kuhn, Caputo contends: "the most creative moments in the history of science occur precisely when scientific stereotypes 'loosen – in times of crisis, anomaly, of 'human idiosyncrasy, error and confusion'" (p.119). Similarly, Feyerabend (1993) argues:

> The only principle that does not inhibit progress is: anything goes [...] Without a frequent dismissal of reason, no progress [...] For what appears as "sloppiness", "chaos", or "opportunism" [...] has a most important function in the development of those very theories which we today regard as essential parts of our knowledge [...] These "deviations", these "errors", are preconditions of progress (p. 158).

Master narratives of theory in the science of social research have been often trapped by limitations and commitments imposed by research paradigm. Being informed by particular paradigms and theoretical frameworks, they often fail to perceive the discursive nature of human matters and thus provide inadequate and less effective solutions to a plethora of today's dilemmas and tensions. As Rivas (2005) argues, research as a 'systematic' process of inquiry has not only been established in the academy with its fields of knowledge and respective disciplines, but also 'institutionalised' in governments, industries, and special interests groups. Embedded in cultural practices, research and the pursuit of knowledge is implicit in social constructions, which are based on modernist/Enlightenment ideologies that are historically specific (modern science) and culturally distinct (the West). The humanist and modernist notions, bearing Western genealogy, and favouring the notion of paradigm, bear a parochial nature with their howling exclusions and swaths of disattended scholarship. The assumption of humanist theories is that they provide a window onto the inner characteristics of people and phenomena, and discovering and establishing a truth, on the
grounds that all research and all knowledges are historically and socially situated—has been often dealt with as unproblematic (Haraway, 1988).

Decolonising projects and deconstructionist interdisciplinary studies, in particular, have exposed the ‘bitter’ nature of these ‘super-theories’, and continue to dismantle their Eurocentric, hegemonic, racist biased frameworks. Mignolo (2000), after Foucault, contends that discourses of modern scientific research, which are believed to free man from the religious dogmatism and political authority, and which entrenched in taken-for-granted assumptions, have particular cultural and historical biases reflecting the ideology of modernity. As Boelhower (2007) contends, “according to this mindset [modernism], the modern world has a single permanent centre, Europe or the West, from which all significant cultural, economic, and political ideas have sprung. Europe is the centre, the inside, whereas the rest of the world is the periphery or the outside. Particularly in the early modern period, the argument goes, Europe proffers and the rest of the world receives” (p. 86). Western conceptual systems, as the key sites of power in the production of knowledge, often adopt westernised vision of research, meaning, ‘reality’, and human existence. Accordingly, they construct the alterity of the ‘other’ merely according to geographical location. The alterity that is ascribed to the ‘other’ continues to re-inscribe locations of periphery at multi levels, and constantly positioned in a comparative framework against the dominant cultural norms (Rivas, 2005).

Under the rubric of social constructionism, for example, ‘reality’ is perceived in terms of its inherent and transhistorical essences, hence is believed as an anti-essentialist approach. However, claims for a radical anti-determinist or ant-essentialist epistemology remain beyond its scope as it fails to adequately consider issues of embodiment, materiality, and power. Issues of embodiment including personal-social histories are imbued with deeply cultural particularities that promote a genus of cultural knowledge. Similarly, materiality is endowed with constraints inherent in material world and always shapes the social constructions we live through and with. Power, on the other hand, (e.g. ‘capitalism’ and ‘patriarchy’) including institutions, governments, and multi-nationals grounds inequalities that arise from those structural features. In a word, the enterprise of modernist research is largely rooted in the power structure of intellectual domination of the academy that perpetuates Eurocentric models of knowing.

On the other extreme of the spectrum, the terrain of critical theory, whether developed in the ‘centre’ or in the ‘margin’, has offered a great deal of research, literature, and practices presently addressing cultural issues and social inequalities. Yet, most of these works endeavour the idea of paradigm (e.g. traditional Marxism, Western Feminism, Multiculturalism and New Historicism, among others) as ‘web of beliefs’ or a particular way of seeing the world around us. In post-colonial critical repertoires, for example, the idea of pluralism is reached by affirming diversity and identities through overdone stereotyping of subordinated groups. The obligation to theoretical framework and paradigm recurrently limits their critique to ideological dogmas through colour ordination, cut-and-paste add-ons to the existing canon, and grouped-based pedagogies (Leistyna and Woodrum, 1998). Although such efforts have yielded a remarkable advancement in critical theory and research, in general, they are often charged for endorsing ideology, dogma, counter violence, and ethnocentricity. As Gur-Ze'ev (2005), contends that in the context of critical pedagogy, Western feminism, and to certain extent, post-colonialism are often trapped by abstracting, objectifying, and even romanticising the lives of those in the margins. Such models exclusively focus on the ‘other’ as a mere concept of difference, and overlook engaging the dominant referent group (the invisible norm of White) by which all others are measured. They often fail to examine the ideologies that inform unequal power relations and social stratification along such lines as cultural identity, representation, value judgements, etc. They produce counter narratives, which substantially replicate ethnocentric ideologies by highlighting issues around nationalism, gender, identity, and difference, and most importantly, they often constitute an affiliation of mainstream endeavours that invite surface criticisms by merely recognising those differences which ultimately
lead to a transformation of the ideological structure of unequal universe (Leistyna & Woodrum, 1998).

Reporting two examples of such scholarly failure, Spivak (1981) reflects on a Sudanese scholar who studied 'female circumcision' in Sudan employing structural functionalism and the French feminist Julia Kristeva’s work on Chinese women. In the first case, Spivak questions the relationship between the researcher, her methodology and the object she studies, and the concepts drawn from Western scholarship and their suitability to a culturally diverse context. Her point is the problematic assumption that systems of knowledge can be generally applied around the world since the divergent cultural context may reveal unseen problems while adopting such approaches. She believes that "[t]he academic feminist must learn to learn from them, speak to them, to suspect that their access to the political and sexual scene is not merely to be corrected by our superior theory and enlightened compassion" (p. 156). In the other case, Spivak criticises the 'First World' feminist assumptions in considering that their gender authorises them to speak for the 'Third World' women. In Kristeva's case, Spivak sees that she appropriates the Chinese culture in her 'First World' particular feminist ends.

**Opening up paradigms**

Historically, the relationship between critical inquiry and research paradigms is dynamic and dialogical, as theory becomes interpreted and re-interpreted, invented and re-invented as paradigms evolve (BERA, 2010). The stance and approach to knowledge has, therefore, undergone a proliferation of concepts and terminologies (-sims) and (-logies) reflecting a plethora of epistemologies and methodologies including interpretivist, hermeneutic, radical hermeneutic, and, (de)constructivist, among others (Lather, 1991; Ropers-Huilman, 1999; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). The allied aim of all of these approaches, however, reflects an enormous body of criticism for 'being servant to dominating interests' (Lather, 1992, p. 88). Such criticisms stem from the fact that the researched phenomena or people are mostly left with evasive when concrete solutions are in demand.

Lather, for example, (1992) favours a return to the concept of 'post-positivism' as a comprehensive term in her argument for opening up paradigmatic alternatives while proposing critical frames in educational research. Post-positivism, according to her, is a concept that delineates a creation of epistemologies and methodologies widely used in the post-modern era. She argues that with the growth of the concepts of pluralism, dynamicity, and mobility that underpin the fragmentation of societies of post-modernity, a reconfiguration of positivism as an established research paradigm is required. According to her, approaches, labelled as 'positivism', should be called into question since they serve 'dominating interests' reflecting 'lust for absolutes and certainty' in ways of knowing. After Foucault (1980), she attacks positivism as reflecting 'regimes of truth' that underpin a "dominant mode of social science inquiry, a code word meaning, at best, 'bourgeois' and 'reactionary and supporting the status quo, at worst" (p. 89).

'Post-positivism', Lather argues, is an all-encompassing concept to delineate a cross-disciplinary research. She contends that within the multitude of critical approaches, including 'legitimation crisis' of cultural authority (Habermas, 1975), 'regimes of truth' (Foucault, 1980), 'the linguistic turn' (Rorty, 1967), 'the politics of knowing' (Said, 1978; Freire, 1985), 'hybridity' and 'third space' (Bhabha, 1994),-- a need for a more comprehensive term requires 'going back' to the concept of post-positivism. She argues that the prefix 'post' in the concepts of 'post-structuralism', 'post-modernism', and 'post-colonialism' challenges and disrupts the continuity of the narratives and discourses of structuralism, modernism, and colonialism (or colonial discourse) as secure foundations of knowledge and understanding. 'Post', in post-positivism, therefore, delineates a radical shift of the conditions of the 'reductionist' tendencies and barren methodological orthodoxy introduced by the
concept of positivism. It also entails disruption of contending paradigms that diffuse legitimacy and authority of knowledge production.

Likewise, Caputo’s (1987) favours the concept of ‘post-paradigmatic diaspora’ as a variety of post-positivistic approach. He argues that it is a compelling approach for justifying the epistemological stance and claims for knowledge in social research. Although the concept of ‘post-paradigmatic diaspora’ has been introduced for more than twenty five years, the concept is overlooked by theorists and researchers. In his argument regarding radical hermeneutics, Caputo himself uses the concept of ‘post-paradigmatic diaspora’ to delineate a proliferation of research methodologies without offering theoretical and practical foundations of the concept. Although the concept of diaspora appears crucial to Caputo’s concept of ‘post-paradigmatic diaspora’, it appears that he disregards ‘diaspora’ when he coined the concept as he does not provide any argument in his book regarding why the term is used.

Alongside with these arguments, I perceive the arguments to open up paradigms and to explore other alternative epistemological underpinning to guide research a continuous and justifiable process, particularly, in the era of post-modernity. In the remaining part of this paper, I introduce my argument regarding diaspora as another contribution to efforts of opening research paradigms for the purpose of freeing epistemologies from theoretical frameworks informed by cultural knowledge and ideological assumptions. First, I introduce an inclusive revision of the concept of Diasporic Philosophy in the context of Frankfort School arguments and how the term has been used in multitude of disciplines. Second, I examine debates around the concept and its historical and interdisciplinary trajectories that direct towards an expansion of the term. Third I explore the potentials of Diasporic Philosophy, embodied in the concept of Diaspora, as an epistemic stance that provides philosophical foundations for socio-cultural research in the era of post-modernity.

The critical theory of Frankfort School

‘The Institute of Social Research (Freedom)’ collectively referred to as ‘Frankfort School’ is a group of German intellectual who affiliated their research to anti-positivistic, psychoanalysis, existential philosophy among other disciplines to renew Marxist traditional philosophy and contextualise their stance in their current times to meet the emergent challenges of Western capitalism as well as communism. The Frankfurt School generated one of the first models of critical cultural studies that analyses the processes of cultural production, political economy, the politics of cultural texts, and social reception and use of cultural artifacts (Kellner, 1989, 1995). Moving from Nazi Germany to the United States, the Frankfurt School intellectuals had experienced a first-hand rise of cultural productions of the capitalist system including arts, media, and popular culture (Wiggershaus, 1994). In the United States, where they found themselves in exile, they focused their research to overcome the limits of positivism, materialism and determinism by returning to the impetus of Diaspora among several other philosophies including Kant’s critical philosophy and its successors in German idealism and Hegel’s philosophy, emphasising contradictions as inherent properties of reality.

Since this institute-in-exile includes intellectuals who affiliated to Jewish and Marxism, and had no chance to survive in Nazist Germany, it could be safely claimed that the domineering force that these intellectuals had gathered around is the sense of their diasporic existence. Although they fulfilled their research activities with enthusiasm, the lived in isolation from their host American environment or what Wiggershaus (1994) calls ‘splendid isolation’. Diaspora for them was an impetus that informs their resistance to traditional Western epistemologies and an endeavour towards their critical thought or what later known as ‘Critical Theory’. In particular, they resisted all regimes of truth, collectively referred to as positivism, and, to meet this aspiration, they insisted on the proliferation of approaches that inform social research. Michael Crotty, in his bestselling book The Foundation of Social Research (2007), writes in the research tradition of Horkheimer who celebrated ‘immediacy and flux’ of research:
He seeks a wedding of philosophy and the various forms of science. He wants a social theory that brings accumulated facts that and does no more than mirror the fragmentation characteristic of contemporary society. Nor does he want a philosophy that to occur, we would have a social philosophy that stands as a critical theory of society and is able to escape the fate of becoming sheer ideology: the intellectual masking of an indigent social reality (p, 131).

Related to this view, is that of Wolin (as cited in Crotty, p. 131) who observes that Frankfort School was founded what later is known as interdisciplinary studies where philosophical reflections are measured against the correctness of empirical social findings, which resulted in advocating a methodological reconstruction or reality as a ‘concrete reality’. In a similar vein, Marcus and Tar (1988) describe the intellectuals of Frankfort Schools as “their writings were part of a tale, whose end is not yet written, of the repudiation by radical academics, especially in the social sciences, of the ancient Western ideal of dispassionate reason, of objective inquiry, in the study of man and society. They were also parts of a tale of men of good will” (p. 29) [emphasis added].

Nonetheless, the major scholarly contribution of Frankfort School is their colossal attempts towards a critical foundation of social research, hence, an introduction to critical theory and ideology critique. In his seminal text Traditional and Critical Theory, Horkheimer (1976) perceived critical theory as a self-conscious social critique that aims to change and emancipate through enlightenment without clinging dogmatically to its own doctrinal assumptions. For the scholars of Frankfort School, critical theory aims to provide an analysis of the true significance of "the ruling understandings"; the fashion of bourgeois scholars and society. They believed that traditional social theory, positivism, in particular, has misrepresented actual human interaction in the real world, and in so doing functioned to justify or legitimise the domination of people by capitalist social thinkers. According to them, the long established tradition of social research provides monolithic and deterministic epistemologies or narratives while interpreting the human phenomena. Yet, this approach conceals as much as it reveals. The Frankfurt theorists generally assumed that their own task was mainly to interpret all the other areas of society which Marx had not dealt with, especially in the superstructure of society or to discover the ‘gaps’ and ‘discontinuities’ that the paradigm fails to notice.

For the purpose of this paper, I highlight two major aspects of the work of Frankfort School concerning social and human research: their opposition and refutation of positivistic and modernist epistemology, and their introduction to critical theory, in general, and their Diasporic Philosophy, in particular. Horkheimer (1976) severely attacked the theory or collectively referred to as positivism as a ‘purely observational mode’ capable of deriving generalisations or "laws" about different aspects of the world. Drawing upon Max Weber, Horkheimer argued that the social sciences are different from the natural sciences, inasmuch as generalisations cannot be easily made from so-called experiences, because the understanding of a "social" experience itself is always fashioned by ideas that are in the minds of researchers themselves. What the researcher does not realise is that he/she is caught in a historical context in which ideologies shape his/her thinking; thus theory would be conforming to the ideas in the mind of the researcher rather than the experience itself. Horkheimer wrote:

The facts which our senses present to us are socially performed in two ways: through the historical character of the object perceived and through the historical character of the perceiving organ. Both are not simply natural; they are shaped by human activity, and yet the individual perceives himself as receptive and passive in the act of perception (p. 213).

For him, the positivistic tradition that natural science utilised and through which scientific knowledge has been advanced cannot be simply copied in the human and social research. Although various theoretical, methodological and epistemological trends introduced as opposing the apparatus of ideology and its constraints in social and human research including pragmatism, neo-
Kantianism and phenomenology, Horkheimer argued that most of these trends failed to achieve their purpose of advancing ideology-critique approaches. The reason for this failure is that all of these trends were subject to what he referred to as a "logico-mathematical" chauvinism which separates research activities from the actual life of the researched people of phenomena. The primary aim of these methodologies is pursuing definite meanings or realities and introduces them as objective, neutral or true. This ultimate goal contradicts with the complexity of human phenomena itself since they disregard the dynamicity and discursiveness of the human condition. In response to this failure, Horkheimer responded with the development of a critical theory beyond the doctrines of informed ideologies and static models (Rasmussen, 1996).

The problem, Horkheimer (1976) argued, is epistemological; “we should not merely reconsider the scientist but the knowing individual in general” (p.252). Unlike the traditional or the doctrines of the orthodox Marxism, which merely passes a ready-made "template" to both critique and action, the critical theory of Frankfurt School sought to avoid dogmatism by being be self-critical and rejecting any pretensions to absolute and final truth. In general, the basic argument of the critical theory is its sceptical approaches to reality by means of questioning the contextual and invisible ideologies that inform epistemological assumptions, which often pass through unnoticed in most cases. In this vein, both; materialism (matter) and idealism (consciousness) are subject to criticism. Critical theory argues that both of these epistemologies distort reality to the benefit, eventually, of some small groups. What critical theory attempts to do is to place itself outside the philosophical strictures and the confines of existing structures of the epistemological paradigms. The thinking tools of critical theory, originated in Neo-Marxist tradition, seek to ‘recover’ the self knowledge of humanity as a domineering guide to claims for knowledge beyond the ‘oppression’ of informed epistemologies (Carr, 2000).

Horkheimer (1976) perceived critical theory as an inclusive stance that addresses the totality of society in its historical specificity by responding to the question of how societies came to be configured at a specific point in time. Through disrupting meta-narratives and collective generalisations regarding the social phenomena, the configuration of societies should be maintained for the ultimate purpose of understanding the interplay between all the major social sciences, including geography, economics, sociology, history, political science, anthropology, and psychology. While critical theory must at all times be self-critical, Horkheimer insisted that a theory is only critical if it is explanatory. Critical theory must therefore combine practical and normative thinking in order to "explain what is wrong with current social reality, identify actors to change it, and provide clear norms for criticism and practical goals for the future" (Bohman, 1996, p. 190). Whereas traditional theory can only mirror and explain reality as it presently is, critical theory's purpose is to change it; in Horkheimer's words the goal of critical theory is "the emancipation of human beings from the circumstances that enslave them" (ibid, p. 190).

Furthermore, critical theory is closely related to the ‘free well’ or ‘moral autonomy’ or to Kantian critical philosophy or morals. The concept of ‘critique’ could be understood as philosophical reflections regarding the limitations and claims made for particular forms of knowledge. These reflections however are maintained through a realisation of the direct connection between its own critique and the emphasis on moral autonomy. Such underpinning of critical theory is important as I will argue below to the promotion of Diasporic Philosophy. How ‘free well’, ‘self-critique’ and ‘autonomy of morals’, as opposed to traditionally deterministic, culturally and ideologically informed theories and epistemologies of human research, is the key premise of the proposed stance of Diasporic Philosophy.

Diasporic Epistemology

‘What is Diasporic Philosophy?’ is a question that requires meticulous engagements with the spirit of the critical theory beyond the rubrics of dogma, essentialism, determinism, and culturally informed
ideologies and above all the negation of the ‘self’ in relation to the ‘other’ or refuting the formula of the authentic ‘I’ and intimacy with self-evidence. Diasporic Philosophy of Frankfort School, according to Gur-Ze’ev (2005), is diasporic critical stance that has emerged in response to recent ideological interpretations of critical theory, in general and Neo-Marxism tradition in particular.

Diasporic Philosophy is embedded in the concept of Diaspora or the ‘scattering of people over spaces’. Historically, the concept of diaspora refers to dispersion of people whether by force or voluntary from their traditional homelands. Originating from the Greek sperio (to sow) and preposition dia (over), diaspora means ‘a scattering or sowing of seeds’ (Beine et al., 2011). Traditionally, the history of the term was closely related to a collective banishment or trauma of particular ethnic, religious, or national groups leading to their geographical dispersal and associated with displacement, victimisation, alienation and loss. Collectively, the concept of diaspora(s), as a scattering of people over space, is often used as a reference to any ‘de-territorialised’ or ‘transitional’ population or group of people whose social, economic, and cultural networks exceed the borders of nation-states in a process of expanding the globe (Vertovec, 1999).

Few decades ago, the concept was limited to a particular group of people and used in its singular form; mainly the dispersion of Jewish from Palestine in the sixth century B.C., and to communities of Jews living outside Palestine (Adamson, 2008). Among those who claim for the restriction of the term is a group of Jewish scholars in an attempt to practice a sort of authority over the meanings of the concept and whom it should refer to. Safran (1991) for example, contends that the concept should be restricted to Jews to reflect their traumatic dispersal experience. He does not only perceive the concept to refer to specific groups of historical displacement (the Jews), but also sets several criteria to determine who should be considered diaspora. Among these criteria, is the group of people maintains a memory of their homeland as their true one, and to which they will return, and which determines their identity. In line with this thought, diaspora could be theorised as ‘a social form’ reflecting a negative experience of traumatic exile from the homeland with the dream of return (Vertovec, 1999). In this archetype, Vertovec explains, diaspora reflects social and political relationship cemented by special ties to history and geography. It maintains a collective identity sustained by an ethnic myth of common origin, historical experience and ties to geographic place. It also develops institutionalising networks of exchange which transcend territorial states by maintaining a variety of explicit and implicit ties with their homelands. Aiming to safeguard its collective identity, it is averse to coalesce or to be fully accepted by host society – thereby fostering feelings of alienation, exclusion, superiority, or other kind of difference.

Scholars have thoroughly examined the concept of diaspora, its origin, and relation to cultural, political, social, educational, psychological representations among others. Although adopting different historical and theoretical modalities, they have a common denominator: the opening of the term that has been thought of as embodying specific referents. The primary concern of these revisionist projects has been with the conjunction of sociology as a politico-economic reality and a proliferation of meanings and usages. As Brubaker (2005) observes, the concept has been expanding to surpass the rigid reference of diaspora to the Jews. He suggests that one element of this expansion in use “involves the application of the term diaspora to an ever-broadening set of cases: essentially to any and every nameable population category that is to some extent dispersed in space” (p. 11).

In this manner, the trajectory of theorising the term grows up towards an expansion of the theoretical and interdisciplinary grounds upon which the term is used. It has also witnessed a point of departure from the closed sense of dispersion and trauma to include myriad structures of people either within or outside the notion of the border state. As the term has gone through a multitude of theorisation in the last few years, the trajectory of the term is proliferated acquiring new meanings utilised in various directions. Brubaker (2005) argues that discussions of diaspora(s) have branched
out to include various domains in semantic, conceptual and disciplinary space. Currently, the concept is used across a broad range of disciplines including: Sociology, Anthropology, Geography, Cultural and Literary Studies, Migration Studies, and Politics International Relations (Adamson, 2008). Brubaker (2005) argues that the concept has become a key vehicle of the proliferation of academic diaspora discussions including: “diasporic citizenship, diasporic consciousness, diasporic identity, diasporic imagination, diasporic nationalism, diasporic networks, diasporic culture, diasporic religion, or even diasporic self” (p. 4). Another manifestation of the proliferation of the concept is dispersion of the term in interdisciplinary and social space that the term is stretched out to include. Among these disciplines, are “history, literature, anthropology and sociology through Black studies, women’s studies, religion, philosophy, communications, folklore, and education [...] art history, cinema, dance, music, and theatre” (Brubaker, 2005, p. 5). The travelling link between these projects and conceptualisations, however, remains an idea of diaspora as revolving around place, space, mobility, locatedness and transnationality (Mcllwaine, 2011a).

As such, the expansion of the term reflects a far-reaching interest in exploring the boundaries of the concept. Such attraction also reflects the enigmatic power of the term as a constitutive aspect of human life. Tololyan (1991) contends that “the term that once described Jewish, Greek and American dispersion now shares meanings with a larger semantic domain that includes words like immigrant, expatriate, refugee, guest-workers, exile community, overseas community, ethnic community” (p. 4). Fernandez (2009) perceives diaspora as a notion that stimulates research in all directions as well as having a power to discover gaps and interrogates the nexus necessary between theory and practice. She believes that the “diaspora can be managed meaningfully if we understand that it is in itself an open-source and that any attempt to limit its scope or its definition transgress the boundaries of both its conceptual and epistemological framing. Diaspora is derived from the idea of scattering of seeds. As such the concept must be allowed to take root, transplant, cross-fertilise, rather than fossilise” (p. 7).

For the particular interest of the present paper, a new ground of research is set out to explore what is referred to as ‘diasporic epistemology’ or diaspora as an impetus of epistemic loci of emaciation. The concept of ‘diasporic epistemology’ or the epistemology of diaspora revolves around the idea of split, dual or hyphenated identities between two or more cultural references. Tawnee (2012) uses the concept of ‘diasporic epistemology’ as “dual reference which affords immigrant subjects some individuality [the unique experience of immigration to individuals], created by the intersection of both structural and cultural conditions specific to a particular diaspora” (p. 11). Diasporic epistemology in this sense refers to dual frames of reference between the ‘homeland’ and host destination, and thus understood as ‘split-epistemology’ where epistemology is defined as a construction of knowledge through external authorities since the time of birth.

Mishra (1996) highlights how ‘diasporic epistemology’ centres itself in the realm of Hybridity as a space constantly confronting ‘cultural regimes’. In the domain of multiculturalism, she refers to diasporic epistemology as a constantly contesting antidote to cultural knowledge and other forms of hegemonic regimes informed by ethnocentric modalities. Close to this line of thought is the notions of diaspora as transitional cultures or what Clifford (1997) refers to as the “contact zones of nations, cultures and regions” (p. 283). Similarly, Bonnerjee et al. (2012) perceive diasporic knowledge as a result of transitional links as well as a multiplicity of belongings and identity where fixity and fetishism invoked by ethnicity can be challenged. In sum, the idea of the difference between the ‘homeland’ and ‘host’ or the connections between ‘roots’ and ‘routes’ (Clifford, 1997) and the ‘historical rift between locations of residence and locations of belonging’ (Gilory, 2000, p. 124) still largely dominate the attempts of theorising an epistemology of diasporas. My purpose in this paper is, however, to establish an epistemological stance beyond the general idea of split and oscillated identities between the binaries of ‘home’/‘host’. I further explore the potential and power of Diasporic Philosophy beyond the idea of diaspora as a ‘scattering of people over the globe’ to argue
that such philosophy could transcendent it boundaries to include people who never experience dispersion in the physical sense.

Diasporic Philosophy draws its philosophical impetus from the notions of diaspora in its broader sense. In the remaining part of this paper, I argue that in our contemporary times which witness an emergence of radical versions of critical theory including postmodernism, post-structuralism, post-colonialism, new versions of feminism, multiculturalism, and queer theories which have enriched the repertoires of critical theory, -- Diasporic Philosophy that qualifies an epistemology of diaspora could place itself in the spectrum of these emergent theories that are utilised in social and human research.

In their later works, Adorno and Horkheimer of Frankfort School developed the beginning of what we refer to nowadays as Diasporic philosophy. I understand Diaspora or more accurately its plural form Diasporas as a vital starting point and an outlet towards affluent alternative thinking that unbinds the mind from the monolith of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’. I also understand Diasporic Philosophy as enabling creative improvisations and births that make Diaspora an impetus to new possibilities for happiness, meaning, aim, and togetherness. As Gur-Ze’ev (2005) argues; having no starting point nor a ‘telos or territory’ and ‘not being at home’ at all costs, Diasporic Philosophy refuses becoming victimised by the ‘self-evidence’, ‘self-content’, and the ‘negation of the ‘other’’. It refuses ‘any identity thinking’ in ontological, epistemological, ethical, existential, and political terms (p. 21-3). Gur-Ze’ev contends that Diasporic Philosophy challenges nihilism in all its forms, yet insists on love and intimacy where human rationality cannot establish an authentic ‘I’. He further claims that:

Diaspora as an ontological, epistemological, existential attunement to the call to self-creation, as against self-forgetfulness; as an alternative to being swallowed by all ‘home-returning’ appeals and all salvation/emancipation agendas and educational projects that offer to constitute the “I” via the “we” and the self-evident, true, or relevant values, truths ideals, and strivings (p. 18).

Several observations can be drawn from this quotation: First, Diasporic Philosophy has no starting point, territory, and not being at home at all costs. To my understanding, the rejection of home or homeland as boundaries that inform our epistemic realisation enable endless possibilities for meaning production beyond the geographical or national boundaries that used to enslave epistemology for a long time. This analysis, I argue, contests with the ‘cultural’ knowledge that informs all prejudices and biased knowledge. In other words, I realise that the act of denying the idea of ‘home’ as impetus to guide our perceptions of the world allows us to better understand the ‘other’ not as a mere object of difference, but as a valid sources of meaning. Adorno and Horkheimer (as cited in Gur-Ze’e, 2005) insisted that ‘there is no cultural document that was not a manifestation of barbarism’ (p. 24). Since culturally informed knowledge act as colouring lenses, one cannot by any means arrive at a just knowledge about other groups of human being. For long, Europe has fallen in this trap, as Said (1978, 1994 and 1995) has argued at length. When cultural knowledge is constructed as a mainstream knowledge, it unquestionably leads to a closure and limitation to our perceptions of the universe for ourselves and for those of others. As Crotty (2007) contends; if cultural knowledge is the basis of meaning-making, then these assumptions or master myths can limit ways of thinking, since culture can best be seen as the source, rather than the result, of human thought and behaviour. Furthermore, the act or crossing beyond the boundaries of ‘culture’ or territories, uncovers the dearth of hidden political agendas while claiming for realities, and enables further epistemic enunciations. In his Location of Culture, Bhabha (1994) insists on the implication of this ‘Third Space’ as an enunciative split for cultural analysis since, according to him, its temporal dimension destroys the logic of synchronicity and evaluation that traditionally give authority to the subject of cultural knowledge. The intervention of the ‘Third Space’, therefore, destroys the mirror of representation of cultural knowledge as a fixed, integrated, open and
expanding code. It also deconstructs and challenges the historical identity of culture as a homogenising and unifying force.

Second, Diasporic Philosophy deconstructs the formula of authentic ‘I’, and refuses to be ‘victimised by the self-evidence, self-content, and negation of the ‘other’ while drawing knowledge about this ‘other’. It also refuses any identity thinking in ontological, epistemological, existential, and political terms’ (Gur-Ze’ev, 2005, p. 21-3). Trusting the ‘self’ as a source of ‘cultural knowledge’ that regulates people’s perceptions and governs their worldviews, is most clearly depicted when the ‘self’ is placed in dialectic assessment with the ‘other’; when cultures are compared dialectically, it might seem normal for a person to depict his or her culture as the best (Said, 1995). Spivak (1991), a post-colonialist theorist and philosopher, succinctly articulates her deconstructive position regarding the ‘self/other’ formula as a guiding approach to meaning making. She contends that our subjectivity is constituted by the shifting discourses of power which endlessly ‘speak for’ us, situating us here and there in particular positions and relations. In these terms we are not the authors of ourselves; the subject cannot be ‘sovereign’ over the construction of selfhood. Instead, the subject is ‘de-centred’ in that its consciousness is always being constructed from positions outside of itself. It follows, then, that the individual is not the point of origin for consciousness, and human consciousness is not a transparent representation of the self but an effect of discourse. Building on this, the construction of identity involves excluding particular characteristics, meanings, and people from a ‘self’ category and assigning them as ‘other’. The construction of an ‘other’, then, is simultaneous with the construction of a ‘self’, where the ‘self’ is defined in terms of the ‘other’ (Kocatepe, 2005). As such, the ‘self’ mounts as a source of a ‘self’s knowledge’ about the ‘other’ and the ‘self’ simultaneously, hence, the knowledge of the ‘self’ is the norm and that of the ‘other’ is the deviation. Hall (1996b) argues that this suggests that the ‘other’ is not only outside, but also inside the ‘self’. The construction of identity, then, can be described as “the relationship of the other to oneself. Only when there is an ‘other’ can you know who you are” (p. 345).

The core thesis of Diasporic Philosophy is to understand and challenge the interconnecting relationship of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ with the purpose to disrupt the dividing lines of binary thinking. In this sense, I argue that Diasporic Philosophy as an epistemic stance empowers researchers to distance the ‘self’ from the ‘norms’ informed by cultural meanings that produce stereotypes and essentialised constructions of culture; it allows a co-construction of knowledge where meanings intermediate between two or more selves, thus, the authentic ‘I’ is shifted into interactional ‘Is’. The creation of attunement that calls for self-creation against self-forgetfulness, Gur-Ze’ev speaks about, challenges being swallowed by all ‘home-returning’ appeals, all salvation/emancipation agendas that offer to constitute the ‘I’ via the ‘we’ and the self-evident, true, or relevant values, truths ideals, and strivings (p. 18). Additionally, the construction of the ‘I’ via the ‘we’ enables dynamic and discursively constructed discourses in social research since the act of employing double-voice rather than single-voice in research allows ‘other’s voices to have authority upon meaning. In this respect, hooks (1984) argues than in ‘single-voiced’ discourse, the speakers adhere to their own view point, paying no attention to the possibly of conflicting voices, and without attempting to perceive themselves as others see or hear them, while ‘double-voice’ discourse calls the social construction of ‘the self in relation’ and speakers see the ‘self’ not as a signifier of one ‘I’ but the coming together of many ‘I’s’ and the intra- and inter-subjective voices are made possible (hooks, 1984).

Drawing on the above arguments, I perceive the implication of Diasporic Philosophy an outstanding endeavour for trustworthy claims for knowledge in social research. The concept of ‘validity’ is a key topic in debate about legitimacy and credibility of research. It is underpinned by positivist assumptions that assume linear relationships between research findings and a single, fixed, and final truth (Seale, 1999). Positivist research paradigms assert that ‘reliability’, is an indicator of the truthfulness and accuracy of the research findings. I recognise the construction of reality or, more
precisely realities in the premise of Diasporic Philosophy an endorsement of 'imaginaries of validity' through which practices respect and appreciates the 'marginalised or the unauthorised 'other' (Foucault 1983). This, according to Scheurich (1997), can be achieved through dialogue and collaboration between the researcher and the 'other' researched.

Additionally, thinkers of Frankfort School render the act of arriving at truth via ideology problematic and 'violent'. Diasporic Philosophy, on the other hand, is a life manifestation against 'contradictions, abysses, dangers, and self-constitution' created by the ideology and dogman of ethnocentric epistemologies. It is therefore 'love of creativity from, against and towards difference, plurality, impasse and contradiction; yet it represents being-towards, becoming, and transcendence. This is why diaspora, as a manifestation of love transcends meaninglessness and insists on revealing as creating meaning, aim, and alternative togetherness with the world and others" (Gur-Ze'ev, 2005, p. 24). Facing the 'instrumentalisation of eros and poiesis as a precondition for culture and successful social structures' (ibid), Diasporic Philosophy offers new possibilities for human creativity that goes beyond the limits of paradigm. It does not only open the gate to 'life as a form of art', but makes possible much more than an alternative counter hegemony by offering a genre of homelessness, which enables a new, 'nomadic', intimacy with the cosmos, and which challenges violence in the name of hope by the power of love and creativity. Therefore, Diasporic Philosophy could be perceived as another possibility that offers an ideology-critique and empowering the skills and the tools of deciphering the politics of cultural and knowledge production. As such, Diasporic Philosophy invites creativity that opposes and overcomes reification of art in face of globalising capitalism and its culture industry by refusing 'the calls for consensual reception and embrace by the fashion and hegemonic ideologies and institutions' (p. 25).

The process of interpretation and meaning-making in the realm or social research, according to Habermas (1990), is inevitably tied to the horizon or value judgements of the interpreter. Bocock (1986) claims that in accordance with the critical theory, "value-neutrality was dangerous, illusion, a chimera, something to be avoided, not to be treated as a guarantee of academic responsibility" (p. 181). In encountering ideology, Diasporic philosophy refutes ideology-laden assumptions by means of promoting a critical attitude to axiomatic and self-evidence stances. In this sense, it challenges the practices and ideologies which inform essentialised constructions of meaning by adopting a discursive reading of human conductions in research. As Fine and Weis (1996) warn, there is a necessity to focus on "ourselves [researchers] as we ravel and unravel the lives and practices of others" (p. 203). Likewise, to avoid ideological postulations while making sense of the world of meanings around us, we, as researchers, need to devise tactics that enable interaction with this world instead of being a product of capricious ideologies and ready-made temples informed by theoretical frameworks.

Diasporic Philosophy addresses the 'infinity of the moment in its endless creative possibilities'. It is an approach that calls for "a fundamental communication with the otherness of the 'other', which precedes cultural borders, political interests, race, national, gender, and other differences. It precedes yet enables truly rational moral elaboration and critiques as well as meaningful enunciations. As such it relates to the most intimate manifestations of becoming-towards-the-world, the 'other, and one's self as a challenge and as an object of shared responsibility, love, creation, and happiness" (Gur-Ze'ev, 2005, p. 26). Yet, Diasporic Philosophy addresses the historical moment; when coming, it places itself in a position against injustice and engages in an even a wider political practice through taking up cognitive, historical, and political dynamics (ibid). Ropers-Huilman (1999) perceives the ultimate role of researchers as work for social justice with an obligation to recognise their engagement in research as an active and partial meaning-making process. They should bear the responsibility to explore multiple and situational understandings of meanings of equity so that they operate a reflexive gaze on the ethical dimension of their enquiry. In other words, they should perceive that in their obligation to 'change others', they, too, must be open to change. In this sense,
diasporic-improviser refuses 'deterministic-mechanic continuum' and rejects being enslaved by 'Enlightenment and Instrumental Rationality'. This epistemological locus that Diasporic Philosophy promotes for individuals could be contextualised in the locale of scholarly research through which infinite and unlimited epistemic outlets and research horizons are opened to researchers.

Furthermore, Diasporic Philosophy does not abandon politics. It rather, when politically involved, does so in the most responsible manner; namely, "engaging the contextual social realities in order to enable the individual to realise his or her respond-ability; respond ability whose actualisation will offer creative possibilities for doing The God while overcoming the logic of the politics altogether" (Gur-Ze’ev, 2005, p. 30). Diasporic Philosophy as such invites a kind of political involvement that assures the 'situatedness of the ethical' in a framework of politics to overcome political and to transcend the historical moment but not to enslave individuals to the imperatives, limits, and possibilities of the political. The realisation of Diasporic Philosophy in social, cultural, and political matters, thus, becomes dialogically "engaged in manners that will give birth to new possibilities for human togetherness" (p. 31). Politics of the world is contingent upon power-relations and symbolic violence, though are relevant factors, they never have the 'upper hand'. In short, when true to him or herself, 'diasporic eternal-improviser' is never a controlled individual in a sense he or she resists 'becoming-swallowed-by-the-system', the social horizons or the historical facts, and believing in the absence of hierarchy and determinism. In his/her representations, courageous-edifying critique, and creative-transformative interpretations, diasporic eternal-improviser bursts into the continuum in all its richness. Denying all kinds of collectivism, dogmatism, a plea for self-evidence, he/she becomes a 'genuine nomad', a 'Third', and 'diasporic' in all sense of the word' (p. 33).

'Diasporic hybridised Spaces' promotes a reconstructive resistant location that offers the possibility for producing unfamiliar languages and provoking discourses that reconfigures identities and cultural 'belonging'. Building on this, Diasporic Philosophy offers an engagement with a political inquiry in which subject-positions genuinely approach questions of power domination, misrepresentation, human suffering, and human struggle by embracing a point of view rooted in a discourse of emancipation. Yet, it transcends its engagement with politics through reconfiguring the logic of power by having a collective love an intimacy with cosmos beyond the identity thinking. Aiming at a reconfiguration of the binary logic and master narratives that maintain cultural hierarchies, 'monumentalism', and hegemony, it locates itself as "a radical standpoint, perspective, position, 'the politics of location' [that ...] enables and promotes varied and ever changing perspectives, a place where one discovers new ways of seeing reality, frontiers of difference" (Giroux, 1992, p.26).

Diasporic Philosophy extends the radical implication of difference and location by problematising all varieties of binary logic through re-contextualising or, more precisely, discarding contextual referents while understanding concepts and meanings. It is worthy to recall Derrida’s (1974) disruption of Saussure’s argument of the arbitrary relationship between a sign and its signified to deconstruct binaries. Derrida argues that the meaning of a sign is never fixed but constantly deferred. He claims that meanings of things are always inhabited by other meanings, and always shifts into new contexts and discourses without erasing the trace of its previous meanings. He refers to this process as différance to denote the differed and different nature of meanings. Derrida contends that, for any given concept, there cannot be a fixed centre or privileged reference from which other meanings of that concept can derive their value. Meanings, then, are not fixed or stable, nor are they mutually exclusive, but refer beyond themselves. In other words, the boundaries that a meaning of a word signifies are in constant change when different subject positions and discourses are drawn on. Derrida concludes that meanings of words are constantly transitory, transient, and fleeting (Kocatepe, 2005). As such, this argument qualifies an understanding of the process of meaning-making and claims for realities as proliferated actions towards dynamic, movable and ever-changing meanings beyond the closed boundaries of paradigm.
Ultimately, Gur-ze’ev contends that Diasporic Philosophy is not only a philosophical 'stance' in the sense that it remains at a theoretical level, but when receiving careful practice, it yields its objectives. Diasporic Response-ability is born in each moment since the birth of human baby. Receiving a unique way of treatment, however, this potential is robbed, reworked, and productivised by sophisticated cultural systems. "In the framework of political arena it is to be historically re-created, edified, cultivated, and protected only at the cost of its transformation into its possible" (p. 27). It is not only a potential for the ethical 'I', it is also a gate to being true to oneself and a way for self-constitution, and a moment of an ontological sign. Alternatively, Diasporic Philosophy offers ontological signs and ethical calls that enable normalised morality in the face of nihilism, ethnocentricity, and other 'homes' that guard the hegemonic legitimacy of the discourse concerning moral responsibility.

Conclusion

The central premise I have engaged with in this paper is the operation of an interdisciplinary approach that includes plethora of disciplines including philosophy, research epistemologies, cultural and literary studies, and critical theory and diaspora studies to attempt a further epistemic stance that guides social and human research. I realise the task was not easy to fulfil and the claims and arguments I forwarded in this paper remain subject to further critique and exploration. This is how I optimise my theoretical engagements with the multitude of concepts I have explored to explore novel insights in academic and scholarly social research. Yet, rarely the path through which this journey has taken place was clear and straightforward, impediments needed to be circumnavigated and sometimes endured, hence, the end of the journey was never in sight. Although the paper has arrived to its end point, the path that was begun needs to be continued, but might be pointed to new directions. Thus, the claim for implications of this paper remains potentially possible through using the theoretical tenets, findings, and reflections introduced in this paper as basis of practice that informs social research. In a word, I choose to close my paper in this manner to indicate that the stance of Diaspora that qualifies Diasporic Philosophy as an epistemic stance requires considerable research to further explore the various directions it might lead to. Nonetheless, for our contemporaries of ‘liquid’ post-modernity where the cyberspace or cyber culture, technologies, the internet, migration, and the constant mobility of human being around the globe,-- a need emerges to explore other epistemic alternatives that remedy and comfort our understanding of the world around us. The flux of diaspora, its labyrinthine nature, discursively constructed and mobilised identities, and its multifaceted manifestations, narrative and dialogic engagements located in-between home and host qualify corrective locale to endure the ‘violence’ and monolith of modernist and paradigmatic certainties. Dalai (2008) maintains: “one among several enigmatic epistemologies of our times is diaspora. It is a complex, constant and constitutive aspect of human life (more so in our time) since the inception of modernity, through colonisation till the recent phenomenon of globalisation” (p. 8).

References


